ON AUGUST 18, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo plunged her administration into all-out-war mode against the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)—eight years after then President Joseph Estrada himself launched total war against the separatist group.

The macho leader was determined to have a military solution that would allow the government to negotiate from a “position of strength” and dictate the terms of the peace agreement. He claimed the military sweep had reestablished Philippine sovereignty over the camps.

National sovereignty was an underlying issue of Estrada’s war policy. It is now the central issue in the Arroyo war policy.

Speaking after the Aug. 18 emergency meeting of the National Security Council, Ms Arroyo declared: “Because of these sneaky and treacherous attacks, as your Commander in Chief, I have ordered the Armed Forces and the Philippine National Police to defend every inch of Philippine territory against MILF forces and immediately restore peace in affected areas in Lanao del Norte.”

She pledged: “We will not tolerate and will crush any attempt to disturb peace and development in Mindanao.”

This was in response to MILF attacks on villages in Lanao del Norte and Sarangani on Aug. 10, after the Supreme Court issued a temporary restraining order on the memorandum of agreement (MOA) to establish the Bangsamoro homeland in Mindanao.

The court order aborted the signing of the MOA scheduled in Kuala Lumpur. The document had triggered a firestorm of nationwide denunciation after it was revealed that the proposed accord would cede huge chunks of the national territory to the Bangsamoro ancestral homeland.

Popularity ploy

Unlike Estrada, whose war policy resulted in the recapture of territories taken over by the MILF, Ms Arroyo has come under fierce criticism. This is because of concerns that the MOA would pave the way for the partition of the Philippine republic in what has been widely condemned as a “sellout” to the MILF.

Ms Arroyo’s all-out-war policy was intended to picture her as a defender of the national territory and as a corrective move to avert the dismemberment of the republic. It sought to rescue her from plunging into a fresh policy crisis over issues that could refuel impeachment actions against her—this time involving complaints of treason.

It cannot be discounted that the Arroyo war policy was launched to regain popularity for the administration plagued by the lowest public approval ratings among all administrations after the 1986 People Power Revolution.

Thatcher example

The conventional political axiom is that war tends to solidify public support behind an unpopular government, if war is perceived as a fight against external threats to national survival and invasion of national territory.

Had the Arroyo administration done its research, it must not have been lost on it that the 1982 Falklands War swept Britain in a wave of nationalism and this was credited for returning Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher to power in the 1983 parliamentary elections.

That war was triggered by the invasion of the Falklands by Argentina. Thatcher sent an amphibious task force to retake the Falklands, defeating the Argentinian Air Force and Navy, and reestablishing the prestige of Britain as a significant naval power in international affairs.

Closer to home, Ms Arroyo took a leaf from the political dividends reaped by Estrada in his all-out war against the MILF in 2000. Taking a bold gamble, Estrada launched his war in April when his satisfaction rating was tumbling.

Gamble paid off

The June 20-July 6 Social Weather Stations survey that year found that Estrada’s satisfaction rating nationwide rose to 47 percent from 43 percent in March, his disapproval rating fell to 34 percent from 38 percent, while his net satisfaction rating rose to +13 percent from +5 percent.

Ms Arroyo’s net satisfaction rating is exceptionally low, creating doubts whether the rebound effect on Estrada of his war policy could be repeated by Ms Arroyo. She has had worse negative net satisfaction ratings than three presidencies—those of Presidents Aquino, Ramos and Estrada.

A separate poll taken by Pulse Asia on July 14-28, 2000, showed that the Mindanao war had boosted Estrada’s popularity rating despite the spiraling costs of fuel and basic commodities, and the further weakening of the peso against the US dollar. Pulse Asia found that Estrada’s net approval rating was due to his “decisive action” against the MILF.

Wavering policies

Since no survey has yet been taken after the outbreak of fighting in Mindanao on Aug. 10, there is no way of knowing whether the presidential declarations have been decisive enough to reassure the public that the government is in control.

Far from being firm, the government has wavered from bold words to what it calls a “new paradigm” as a framework of renewed peace talks.

On Sept. 3, Ms Arroyo ended 11 years of peace talks with the MILF by announcing that she had disbanded the government’s peace panel. She declared that the government could not be forced to sign an agreement on an expanded Bangsmoro homeland “at gunpoint.”
Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro said the MILF had become “irrelevant” after it refused to surrender commanders blamed for the sack of the towns in Mindanao. He said dialogues with armed groups would henceforth be based on “demobilization, disarmament and rehabilitation.”

No rebound in sight

How much pressure the government can exert on the MILF to negotiate under the government’s terms depends on the success of its military campaign.

It is a war policy that has shown no results in the capture of the renegade rebel commanders or the retaking of major rebel camps. It has shown only mounting civilian casualties, havoc on civilian dwellings, and uprooted refugee families. It is a war policy labeled as a “peace” policy.

Estrada had more to show for his war policy in restored territories. He never disguised it as a peace policy. The Arroyo policy has not established any foundation for her to piece back her shattered popularity. No rebound or political dividends are in sight.

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